Against that backdrop, Europe’s reliance on American-made AI begins to look more and more like a liability. In a worst case scenario, though experts consider the possibility remote, the US could choose to withhold access to AI services and crucial digital infrastructure. More plausibly, the Trump administration could use Europe’s dependence as leverage as the two sides continue to iron out a trade deal. “That dependency is a liability in any negotiation—and we are going to be negotiating increasingly with the US,” says Taddeo.
The European Commission, White House, and UK Department for Science, Innovation and Technology did not respond to requests for comment.
To hedge against those risks, European nations have attempted to bring the production of AI onshore, through funding programs, targeted deregulation, and partnerships with academic institutions. Some efforts have focused on building competitive large language models for native European languages, like Apertus and GPT-NL.
For as long as ChatGPT or Claude continues to outperform Europe-made chatbots, though, America’s lead in AI will only grow. “These domains are very often winner-takes-all. When you have a very good platform, everybody goes there,” says Nejdl. “Not being able to produce state-of-the-art technology in this field means you will not catch up. You will always just feed the bigger players with your input, so they will get even better and you will be more behind.”
Mind the Gap
It is unclear precisely how far the UK or EU intends to take the push for “digital sovereignty,” lobbyists claim. Does sovereignty require total self-sufficiency across the sprawling AI supply chain, or only an improved capability in a narrow set of disciplines? Does it demand the exclusion of US-based providers, or only the availability of domestic alternatives? “It’s quite vague,” says Boniface de Champris, senior policy manager at the Computer & Communications Industry Association, a membership organization for technology companies. “It seems to be more of a narrative at this stage.”
Neither is there broad agreement as to which policy levers to pull to create the conditions for Europe to become self-sufficient. Some European suppliers advocate for a strategy whereby European businesses would be required, or at least incentivized, to buy from homegrown AI firms—similar to China’s reported approach to its domestic processor market. Unlike grants and subsidies, such an approach would help to seed demand, argues Ying Cao, CTO at Magics Technologies, a Belgium-based outfit developing AI-specific processors for use in space. “That’s more important than simply access to capital,” says Cao. “The most important thing is that you can sell your products.” But those who advocate for open markets and deregulation claim that trying to cut out US-based AI companies risks putting domestic businesses at a disadvantage to global peers, left to choose whichever AI products suit them best. “From our perspective, sovereignty means having choice,” says de Champris.
But for all the disagreement over policy minutiae, there is a broad belief that bridging the performance gap to the American leaders remains eminently possible for even budget- and resource-constrained labs, as DeepSeek illustrated. “If I would already think we will not catch up, I would not [try],” says Nejdl. SOOFI, the open source model development project in which Nejdl is involved, intends to put out a competitive general purpose language model with roughly 100 billion parameters within the next year.
“Progress in this field will not to the larger part depend anymore on the biggest GPU clusters,” claims Nejdl. “We will be the European DeepSeek.”
Source: www.wired.com
